New Delhi, Sep 23 (IANS) The activation of the China–Pakistan Boundary Joint Commission may look like routine diplomacy. But behind its language of surveys, trade and border markers lies a larger dispute over who has the right to manage territory connected to Kashmir. China and Pakistan call the commission practical; India sees it as an attempt to make a disputed arrangement appear permanent.

A New Mechanism

China and Pakistan operationalised the commission at its first meeting in Islamabad on September 16-17, 2026. The meeting was co-chaired by Li Ya of China’s Foreign Ministry and Bilal Mahmood Chaudhary of Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry. They discussed border management, joint surveys, cross-border movement, trade and people-to-people links and agreed to meet again in China.

The commission was created under the 2013 China–Pakistan Agreement on the Boundary Management System. Article 45 provides for a joint body to supervise border-management arrangements. Its duties include inspecting the frontier, conducting surveys, maintaining markers, managing cross-border facilities and dealing with incidents. If a marker cannot be returned to its original position, the commission may choose another site, but it is not supposed to alter the boundary line.

The aim sounds administrative. Yet each survey, inspection and facility can strengthen control when a border’s legal status is contested.

The Unresolved Foundation

The commission rests on older history. China and Pakistan signed their original boundary agreement in Beijing on March 2, 1963. It placed the Shaksgam Valley, also known as the Trans-Karakoram Tract, under Chinese control. India says the territory is part of Ladakh and that Pakistan had no right to transfer it. New Delhi has never recognised the 1963 agreement and calls it illegal and invalid.

The 1963 agreement described the settlement as provisional. Article 6 said that after India and Pakistan settled the Kashmir dispute, the sovereign authority concerned would reopen negotiations with China and sign a formal boundary treaty. This clause is central to the criticism, the original arrangement acknowledged that Kashmir was unresolved, while the new commission creates a continuing system for managing the frontier.

India says the disputed area covers about 5,180 square kilometres in the Shaksgam Valley. For New Delhi, the issue concerns sovereignty and Pakistan’s authority to negotiate over territory it claims.

Trade and Strategic Access

The Commission supports trade and movement through the Khunjerab Pass, the main land route linking China’s Xinjiang region with Pakistan. The pass is connected to the Karakoram Highway and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Coordination can help customs and transport, but can also deepen the route’s strategic value.

India objects to CPEC projects passing through Pakistan-administered Kashmir because it considers the region Indian territory. Critics argue that infrastructure and border cooperation are not neutral. Roads, crossings and official surveys can create facts on the ground and make future negotiations harder.

For Pakistan, the commission offers stronger trade links and closer cooperation with China. For Beijing, it protects a sensitive connection between Xinjiang and Pakistan and provides an official channel for security and infrastructure concerns. The arrangement serves both interests.

India’s Legal Objection

India rejected the commission after its activation. Its External Affairs Ministry said there is no legally recognised China–Pakistan boundary concerning Indian territory and called the body without legal basis. New Delhi said Pakistan has no authority to make arrangements involving territory that India describes as under Pakistan’s illegal and forcible occupation.

India’s objection has two parts. First, it rejects the 1963 transfer of Shaksgam Valley and says Pakistan could not negotiate away territory claimed by India. Second, it opposes CPEC and related infrastructure in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. India argues that the commission cannot change its sovereignty claims or legitimise control by China and Pakistan.

China and Pakistan reject this interpretation. They treat their agreements as valid bilateral arrangements and describe the commission as normal border cooperation. Their position is that the body will manage practical matters, not settle India’s larger Kashmir claim.

Why It Matters

The commission does not formally redraw a map. Its immediate role is to maintain markers, conduct surveys, manage crossings and prevent incidents. But its political effect may be greater than its technical mandate. Regular meetings can make disputed control look normal, while infrastructure and trade can bind the territory more closely to China and Pakistan.

That is why the commission has become a regional issue. Beijing and Islamabad see a useful instrument for stability and connectivity. India sees an attempt to institutionalise an arrangement made without its consent and involving territory it claims. The criticism is simple: technical administration cannot erase a political dispute or create lawful ownership.

--IANS

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